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INTERNATIONAL CoNFLicr FOR BEGINNERS. By Roger Fisher. Illustrations by Robert C. Osborn. N.Y.: Harper & Row. 1969 Pp.
xvii, 231. $5.95.

This is a peculiar book. Its message is normal enough; the tactics
of dealing successfully among nations-getting a foreign country to
go along with most of what you want-do not differ in kind from
those employed among smaller groups, corporations, or individuals.
By and large, these tactics consist of putting oneself mentally in the
other fellow's shoes, and then fashioning proposals which do not
utterly disregard his interests, while packaging them as attractively
as possible. If he does not agree with your proposals because the substance of what he is asked to give is greater than what he will get in
return, you have at least gotten a bit ahead in public opinion, which
in long- or short-run terms will be a net advantage at the next
round. Not a profound message, no doubt, but nonetheless commonsense, normal behavior on the whole.
What makes the book peculiar is that its author embroiders this
message-which, as indicated, most diplomats and other negotiators
have for a long time known very well and acted upon when they
could-with breathless examples which indicate that he thinks that
he is purveying something original or provocative. To compound
the peculiarity, he provides a concrete application of the desired
technique to a current international crisis, but his application demonstrates that he does not have the foggiest notion how to work
his own "system."
Picking the Arab-Israeli dispute as a vehicle ["I devoted a couple
of days to thinking about Middle East" (p. 203)], Professor Fisher
drafted a variety of documents designed to demonstrate how to use
his approach. Piecemeal progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement
was in his view desirable, since he was convinced that an over-all
settlement was not a real possibility. Positioning himself as an advisor to Nasser (not an unnatural position for one who had staked
out a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli position since at least prior to the June
1967 war), the author suggests that it would be wise to strive at the
outset for a "partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai combined with an opening of the Suez Canal" (p. 208). He suggests that
Nasser open the discussion on this basis by sending a letter to
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations. This letter, lest
we forget, is supposed to present Israel with a "yessable" proposition
by taking due account of her interests and by being palatably
packaged.
Nasser states, in the author's draft letter, that he "accepts" the
fact that there is a "new state in the Middle East," and that "it is
called Israel" (p. 212-13). He further "accepts the fact" that Israel's
international boundaries are no more restrictive than those provided
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in the 1949 Armistice Agreement, "and no more extensive than those
of the territory occupied by Israeli forces as of June 4, 1967" (p. 213).
Israel is thus asked to forgo that portion of the November 1967 Security Council resolution calling for recognized and secure boundaries
-a portion which to her, to the United States, and to the other nonArab, non-Soviet-bloc countries, envisaged negotiated territorial adjustments in Israel's favor (with respect to the Golan Heights area,
for example), so that she would not be placed once again in her
precarious pre-June 6, 1967, situation.
On the basis of this little blockbuster-or perhaps Israel is not
supposed to be able to read and understand the words-"as a demonstration of our earnest desire to move forward even before Israeli
troops have been fully withdrawn from our territory" (p. 213),
Israel is to withdraw forty kilometers from the Suez Canal, so that
the canal can be opened (for Egypt's revenue and benefit, it may be
added). Then cargo to and from Israel, but not Israeli ships, will be
permitted to transit the canal, as before June 1967.
In short, this "yessable proposition" would restore the pre-June
6, 1967, situation in all particulars; and in exchange Israel gets
what? She gets Arab acceptance "as a physical fact [of] the geographical existence of the State of Israel and, when it gets back within the
borders it was respecting [that is, the pre-June 6, 1967, borders], we
will not use force against it" (p. 214). Nasser, however, would still
not be "prepared to recognize politically the present Government of
Israel as a legitimate government, whether judged by its domestic or
its international behavior" (p. 214), because Israel discriminates
against Arabs in a manner "just as immoral" as did "pre-war Germany against Jews," and hence is today a Frankenstein creature, unwilling to abide by international law or the unanimous decisions of
the Security Council" (p. 215).
Need more be said about the author's ability to see the other
fellow's position and fashion proposals attractive to him? Can anyone really think that Israeli rejection out of hand of such a proposition would secure it anything but applause from a world public
opinion with any common sense at all? But no matter; it is clear that
what we have here must be one large put-on-a huge tongue-incheek. The author must be making an ironic plea for the kind of
wisdom and judgment which alone can deal meaningfully with
deep-seated conflicts. What he must be trying to tell us, in an unusual display of self-abnegation, is that cute tactical ploys, even
when they are well-fashioned, cannot begin to cope with real world
problems.
The illustrations by Osborn are comical.
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